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researchers best construct theory when they construct arti-
facts for students and reflect on solutions to emergent prob-
lems encountered in so doing. These problems emerge for 
researchers in making sense of how students engage the 
artifacts. Researchers’ solutions to these emergent prob-
lems of analysis are expressed in the form of new or refined 
theoretical models that attempt to explain educational 
processes (diSessa and Cobb 2004). Over a succession of 
design projects, this iterative dialectical process of building 
artifacts and theory continues, where aspects of effective 
design practice are identified and articulated into principled 
frameworks, lessons learned are applied to new contexts, 
and then new insights are generalized further (Confrey 
2005; Streefland 1993).
This reflective article discusses the role of design 
research in promoting learning theory. The context selected 
for the reflection is an enduring educational-research prob-
lem—the roles that naïve, spontaneous forms of knowing 
and acting may play in fostering conceptual learning. The 
article discusses a multi-project dialectical evolution of 
theoretical models pertaining to this problem. I argue that 
a succession of design-research studies has brought about 
iterative transformational change in one researcher’s con-
ceptualization of naïve knowing and its didactical affor-
dances. I implicate this transformational change in the 
micro-analysis of children’s behaviors as they engage in 
cognitive and dialogical problems centered on activities 
with artifacts designed for these studies. I imply that my 
subjective experience generalizes broadly to educational 
scholarship.
To lend structure to this reflection, I will begin by draw-
ing on the literature to trace a historical trajectory in edu-
cational scholarship pertaining to the role of naïve knowl-
edge in conceptual learning. I then recount my ontogenetic 
journey as mapped upon this phylogenetic journey yet 
Abstract Design research is a broad, practice-based 
approach to investigating problems of education. This 
approach can catalyze the development of learning theory 
by fostering opportunities for transformational change in 
scholars’ interpretation of instructional interactions. Sur-
veying a succession of design-research projects, I explain 
how challenges in understanding students’ behaviors pro-
moted my own recapitulation of a historical evolution in 
educators’ conceptualizations of learning—Romantic, Pro-
gressivist, and Synthetic (Schön, Intuitive thinking? A met-
aphor underlying some ideas of educational reform (work-
ing paper 8). Division for Study and Research in Education, 
MIT, Cambridge, 1981)—and beyond to a proposed Sys-
temic view. In reflection, I consider methodological adapta-
tions to design-research practice that may enhance its con-
tributions in accord with its objectives.
Papert (1980), who was a student of Piaget, champions 
the pedagogical implications of constructivism: children 
best learn via engaging in goal-oriented interactions with 
materials and reflecting on solutions to emergent problems 
they encounter in so doing. And yet adding a pragmatic 
twist to constructivism, Papert (1991) coined the term 
“constructionism” so as to suggest that children best con-
struct knowledge when they construct artifacts in the public 
domain. I believe that adults, too, best construct knowledge 
when they construct artifacts in the public domain, and 
this includes educational researchers constructing experi-
mental learning materials. I thus view design research 
as a constructionist approach to educational research: 
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extending beyond it. This “cartographical” exercise should 
indicate that my own path has not been a random walk 
visiting arbitrary points, but rather a reinvention of a his-
torical succession of educational frameworks leading to an 
emerging new framework that charts new territory. As such, 
although my design projects per se are idiosyncratic, the 
congruence of my intellectual journey with the historical 
evolution of educational theory could lend credence to the 
design-research practices that fueled and formed the odys-
sey and, by induction, to the emerging theory.
1  Introduction: reinventing learning theory as a 
historical and future journey
In his survey of educational reform since Rousseau, Schön 
(1981) discerns three major pedagogical views on the role 
of children’s naïve conceptions in their instruction. He 
names these views Romantic, Progressivist, and Synthetic.
The Romantic view is passionate and subversive, ema-
nating from a vision of childhood as a safe haven rather 
than an apprenticeship for adulthood. Schools, by this view, 
can be harmful to children’s development. Whereas schools 
ought to introduce curricular content by engaging the child 
directly with natural phenomena, schools in fact use inac-
cessible formal notations and mechanistic algorithms in 
reference to these same phenomena. Consequently, the 
child often encounters difficulty in making sense of instruc-
tion and ultimately develops a belief that formal knowledge 
is divorced from the senses and sensibility (see also Dewey 
1938; Kamii and Dominick 1998; Nathan 2012; P. W. 
Thompson 2013). Rather, the educator should create oppor-
tunities for exploration and discovery, always preferring the 
situated and playful over the symbolic and solemn. A unit 
of analysis here would be the singular child, with the adult 
playing an incidental external role as the wise steward. The 
process of learning is discovery, defined as taking sponta-
neous actions to apprehend patterns and consistencies in 
natural phenomena. Through discovery children transition 
from not knowing to knowing.
Romanticists “invented childhood” and in so doing cre-
ated legitimacy to treat young humans as deserving age-
appropriate instructional regimes, a legacy greatly present 
in contemporary scholarship, commerce, and recreation. 
Yet as we now discuss, this sturm und drang was met by 
reactionary forces that shared its passion yet tempered its 
pedagogical implications.
The Progressivist view takes a step forward toward chart-
ing an educational program. Endorsing learners’ need for 
situated interaction, Progressivists perceive epistemic con-
tinuity from informal to formal perspectives on phenomena. 
Progressivists believe in the civic mandate and pedagogi-
cal potential of educational institutions to foster cognitive 
continuity from informal to formal knowledge via imple-
menting principled didactical intervention. By the Progres-
sivist view, educators should craft for students structured 
opportunities to reenact cultural–historical phylogenesis 
from naturalistic ways of being and knowing to techno-
scientific concepts (Brousseau 1997; Freudenthal 1983). 
Children will thus develop their naïve views into more 
sophisticated forms of reasoning (von Glasersfeld 1987). 
In particular, by adopting cultural forms, students will be 
able to express, organize, elaborate, and appreciate what 
they already see and know, so that their naturalistic incli-
nations become better fit for cultural praxis. Children thus 
enjoy logically planned, scheduled occasions of exercising 
their natural inclinations to discover and learn in authentic 
settings, thus expediting their teleological course of cogni-
tive development toward maturity and reason as upstand-
ing participating members of the adult community (see also 
Froebel 1885/2005). Yet whereas educators craft for chil-
dren various devices that enhance their development, further 
intervention should be minimal, because children best learn 
when left to their own devices. So doing, children creatively 
reconfigure their situated sensorimotor forms so as better 
to fit the natural or cultural ecologies they encounter. The 
unit of analysis here once again is the learning child, the 
process is that of discovery, defined as recognizing common 
structures across diverse situations, and knowing consists of 
being able to apply the emerging models to new contexts.
As a general plan of action, the Progressivist view under-
lies much of what we call reform-oriented practices in edu-
cation. And yet from a theoretical point of view, sometimes 
Progressivists under- or mis-represent the overwhelmingly 
formative role of cultural intervention in shaping concep-
tual development. For researchers, this means that experi-
mental designs are far more than the “materials” and “pro-
cedure” detailed in methods sections of empirical reports 
describing pedagogical studies of essentially individualistic 
learning. Rather, everything about the researcher–student 
interaction is relevant to making sense of the student’s 
behavior.
The Synthetic view, like its historical antecedents, 
embraces the pedagogical utility of both leveraging chil-
dren’s naïve knowing and introducing disciplinary struc-
ture. However the Synthetic view problematizes the pos-
sibility of cognitive continuity from naive to disciplinary 
constructions of the world, even through guidance. Whereas 
the literature presents a variety of positions with respect to 
the affinity or dichotomy of naïve and scientific knowledge, 
the Synthetic view generally resonates with sociocultural 
theory (Newman et al. 1989; Sfard 2002), social construc-
tivism (Yackel and Cobb 1996), and perspectives from psy-
chology (Chi 2013; Kahneman 2003).
The Synthetic view cites naïve and disciplinary con-
structions as epistemologically incompatible. These 
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informal and formal constructions might overlap only 
loosely (“transitively”) via common discursive reference. 
That is, a teacher and student may refer to the same object 
in a perceptual display even as they construct the object dif-
ferently. Development toward formal constructions implies 
reconfiguration in the visualization of situations. As such, 
any instructional intervention seeking to introduce formal 
constructions necessarily requires students to re-see a phe-
nomenon in ways that depart from naturalistic orientation. 
By way of supporting this re-seeing, teachers should guide 
students to attend to, parse, visualize, reify, and label the 
latent properties and aspects of phenomena in ways that 
hitherto may have never occurred to them as remotely 
relevant to the task at hand, yet are vital for professional 
practice (see also Arcavi 2003; Bamberger 1999; Goodwin 
1994). Yet whereas the teacher’s role is to steer the child’s 
appropriation of these cultural–historical ways of seeing 
situations, the teacher should also optimize the prospects 
of the child somehow coordinating and perhaps reconciling 
these vying naïve and scientific constructions of the world 
(see also Bartolini Bussi and Mariotti, 2008; Job and Sch-
neider 2014; Radford 2014).
Children enjoy structured opportunities to engage in dia-
logic internalization and appropriation of formal views on 
familiar phenomena. The unit of analysis here is the tutor–
student dyad or teacher–students manifold, and the process 
of learning is appropriation, defined as adopting the hegem-
onic visualization of phenomena under inquiry. Knowing 
emerges through participating with increasing competency 
in the social enactment of the disciplinary cultural prac-
tice. Yet this new know-how should optimally be grounded, 
via reflection, in naïve orientations to these situations. So 
doing, learners render transparent any new artifacts they 
engaged along the way. It is this latter Synthetic view that 
Schön evaluates as best depicting the objective of educa-
tional intervention.
Any historical survey naturally begs the question, What 
next? Does this intellectual evolution stop at the Synthetic 
perspective on learning, or is this yet another milestone on 
an endless journey from Enlightenment toward ultimate 
enlightenment? In this essay I will be suggesting that the 
journey continues, and that the next golden age, which 
builds on the Synthetic view yet expands on it, might be 
called “Systemic”.
The Systemic view does not reject the Synthetic view 
but qualifies, broadens, explicates, and ultimately supports 
it. In that sense, the evolution in theory from the Synthetic 
to the Systemic is not as abrupt as from the Progressivist to 
the Synthetic, but more of a complexification. The Systemic 
view draws broadly from emerging perspectives in learning 
sciences: Enactivist philosophy (Varela, E. Thompson, and 
Rosch 1991), situated cognition (Greeno 1998), distributed 
cognition (Kirsh 2013; Martin 2009), dynamic-systems 
theory (Thelen and L. B. Smith 1994), extended mind (E. 
Thompson and Stapleton 2009), ecological psychology 
(Gibson 1977), and ecological dynamics, a theory of learn-
ing from sports sciences (Chow et al. 2007; Newell 1986). 
The Systemic view was first developed in Abrahamson and 
Trninic (2015) and has been elaborated in Abrahamson and 
Sánchez-García (2014).
In its unit of analysis, the Systemic view maintains the 
teacher and learner, but reconfigures them into a dynami-
cal system that includes the learner as an agent, some task 
that the agent is attempting to accomplish, and a general 
environment that includes the teacher as a sentient interac-
tive element. Left to its own devices, the system is taken 
to be functioning in some dynamical stability. The process 
of learning is perceived as the systemic reconfiguration in 
transitioning from one dynamical stability to the next. The 
agent is spurred to adapt when it apprehends new environ-
mental constraints on its task-oriented activity. For example, 
a teacher might deliberately introduce into a learning envi-
ronment constructive perturbation that problematizes the 
student’s interactions with the world. Achieving synthesis, 
such as between naive and scientific knowing, is an emer-
gent process, in which task-oriented interactions among the 
agent and the designed/monitored environment are tight, 
rapid, volatile, and recursive. What we call learning is the 
emergence of new systemic stability borne from the agent’s 
concerted efforts to adjust, develop, and refine coordina-
tion patterns for availing of newly encountered features or 
aspects of the environment toward achieving evolving goals. 
From the Systemic view, conceptual synthesis manifests in 
more than just binary either/or states but comes by degrees, 
just as physical skill varies by degree of dexterity within and 
between individuals. Learning is tightening one’s grip on 
the world (Bernstein 1996; Merleau-Ponty 2005).
The Systemic view presents a historical opportunity to 
revisit early cybernetics research on cognitive development 
(Piaget 1970) and thus position genetic epistemology as 
squarely relevant to emerging theoretical models of human 
reasoning as simulated motor action (a.k.a. the “embodi-
ment turn”, e.g., Gibbs 2011). All conceptual learning 
begins from the solution of new motor-action problems, 
whether or not these problems or solutions are overtly man-
ifest as explicit external activity (Melser, 2004). As Vygot-
sky stated (1926/1997), “Even the most abstract thoughts 
of relations that are difficult to convey in the language of 
movement, like various mathematical formulas,….are 
related ultimately to particular residues of former move-
ments now reproduced anew” (p. 162).
By thus embracing the respective theories both of Piaget 
and Vygotsky, the Systemic view could also stand to serve 
in promoting a reconciliation of their seminal contribu-
tions (Cole and Wertsch 1996). Similar to Vygotsky, Pia-
get implicated knowledge as both manifest in, and modified 
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by situated interaction. Whether it is couched as discursive 
or operational, knowledge is inherently immersive, rela-
tional, and interactive. Counter to Spackman and Yanchar 
(2013), I do not view a schema as an internal representa-
tion but as a systemically distributed dynamical routine: 
“Knowing does not really imply making a copy of reality 
but, rather, reacting to it and transforming it (either appar-
ently or effectively) in such a way as to include it function-
ally in the transformation systems with which these acts are 
linked” (Piaget 1971, p. 6). I therefore join Allen and Bick-
hard (2013) in suggesting the enduring and even increasing 
relevance of Piaget’s epistemological constructs for current 
research and theorizing of human learning.
The Systemic view thus ascribes a pivotal role to stu-
dents’ reflective motor-action activity in the emergence of 
conceptual knowledge (Abrahamson and Sánchez-García 
2014; Abrahamson and Trninic 2015). This theoretical 
view bears the practical implication that each agent–child 
must discover a subjective solution to an embodied inter-
action task and only then signify it formally. The educa-
tor’s role is to engage the child in solving an accessible, 
asymbolic, physical interaction problem. In so doing, 
the educator attends to the child’s sensorimotor explora-
tion via second-person kinesthetic empathy (Depraz et al. 
2003). Once the child has demonstrated adequate mas-
tery and explained the solution, the educator interpolates 
into this new dynamical equilibrium carefully selected or 
crafted elements, such as symbolic artifacts, that perturb 
this equilibrium productively. Children enjoy opportuni-
ties initially to engage intuitively in free-form problem 
solving within well-structured learning environments. 
Next, they tackle new constraints introduced into the envi-
ronment that shift them into formal models of the same 
situations. Finally, they describe their actions within what 
turns out to be mathematical semiotic register. Table 1 
summarizes the four views on the role of naïve reasoning 
in STEM learning.
The Systemic view on the phenomenon of learning is a 
natural outcome of twentieth century scholarship (Clancey 
2008) and accommodates twenty-first century develop-
ments in epistemology, pedagogy, and technology (Abra-
hamson et al. 2012). In particular, the dynamical-systems 
principle of emergence can account for the constructive 
role of irrational exploratory behavior in problem solving 
(Fischer 2001; Lakatos 1976) and vitiate the learning para-
dox (Bereiter 1985). In turn, emergence resonates strongly 
with non-prescriptive pedagogy (Turkle and Papert 1991) 
and the increasing appreciation of error as conducive to 
learning (Kapur 2014).
The Systemic view is widely encompassing in its atten-
tion to structures and processes relevant to making sense 
of individual learning. The view implies that research-
ers themselves are agents of interest in the systemic 
interpretation of learning (see also Jaworski 2012; White 
2008). We could ultimately achieve a deeper understand-
ing of student learning by stepping back to engage in her-
meneutic analysis of our own tacit framing of the research 
process and our agency therein (Barwell 2009; Guba and 
Lincoln 1998; Yanchar 2011). This reflective practice is 
vital to promoting the modeling of educational phenom-
ena under inquiry, because it exposes epistemological and 
theoretical assumptions implicitly forming our research ori-
entation, rationale, and design (Schön 1983; Tracey et al. 
2014). Specifically, researchers, too, may need to synthe-
size apparently incompatible views of phenomena under 
inquiry. But how does such synthesis come about? Can 
design research foster such synthesis? If so, what is the 
mechanism by which design projects create opportunities 
for researchers to coordinate new ways of conceptualizing 
their subject matter of student learning?
In this paper, I describe the role of design-based research 
in my personal journey toward the Progressivist view, on to 
the Synthetic view, and beyond to the proposed Systemic 
view. The objective of the paper is to describe the role of 
design-based research in the development of theories of 
learning.
There is a certain professional awkwardness in realiz-
ing that one has been reinventing the history of educational 
reform piecemeal rather than simply accepting current 
knowledge. But then again, it would be self-defeating for 
a scholar of constructivist affiliation to expect of his own 
learning process anything short of ontogeny recapitulating 
phylogeny. The plan of the paper is to trace this personal 
development by overviewing several design projects and 
explaining how they each contributed to forming my cur-
rent views.
2  Learning theory by three designs
Though they have left a formative mark on the history of 
Western intellectualism, staunch Romantic views of learn-
ing are now often viewed as quaint and untenable. As a stu-
dent of cognitive sciences, I began my career already disil-
lusioned by the prospects of purist Romantic views to offer 
viable educational programs. I learned to think of myself as 
a Progressivist. The following three projects from the past 
two decades of research are milestones in my theoretical 
development through design research, from a Progressivist 
view and onward:
•	 “Seeing Chance” (probability)—from Progressivist to 
Synthetic
•	 “Kinemathics” (proportion)—from Synthetic to Sys-
temic
•	 “Giant Steps” (algebra)—expanding the Systemic
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The narratives for each project explain our design ration-
ale and hypotheses, our surprise when things went counter 
to our expectations, and our inferences from these surprises 
(see also Lobato et al. 2015 (this issue) on constructive 
failures in design research). If I use the plural “we” rather 
that just the singular “I”, it is because much of the work 
described herein was done in collaboration with graduate-
student researchers.
2.1  From progressivist to synthetic view of learning: 
Seeing Chance (probability)
The Seeing Chance project (Abrahamson 2012a) was 
founded on the Progressivist rationale of creating opportu-
nities for learners to articulate informal judgments of likeli-
hood in terms of formal sample spaces. Given appropriate 
materials, activities, and facilitation, I initially assumed, 
children would experience cognitive continuity along this 
learning path—they would see the formal framing of likeli-
hood as elaborating on their informal view.
2.1.1  Design problem and rationale
The mathematical content of probability has long chal-
lenged students of all ages (Jones et al. 2007). Specifically, 
there have been no empirical demonstrations, to date, of 
children spontaneously reinventing correct sample spaces 
of compound events by noticing latent formal structures 
in the learning materials themselves. Perhaps those studies 
failed to elicit and engage early conceptions (Smith et al. 
1993).
We know that infants are able to judge correctly the 
relative likelihood of binomial random samples vis-à-
vis the population from whence they are drawn (Denison 
and Xu 2014). For example, infants register a sample of 
four green balls emerging from a mixed green/blue col-
lection of balls as more surprising than a sample of two-
green-and-two-blue balls. The infants use what Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) have called the representativeness 
heuristic, that is, they register the sample’s internal bino-
mial ratio (e.g., the ratio of green balls to blue balls) and 
compare this ratio to figural, structural, compositional, or 
procedural properties of the randomness phenomenon from 
which it was generated. So doing, however, the infants do 
not attend to the set of independent outcomes compos-
ing the sample, as in the formal classicist-probability pro-
cedure of combinatorial analysis (i.e., the specific order 
of green and blue balls in the sample). Thus when they 
make their judgment calls, infants do not bear in mind 
the entire sample space of all such possible sets (all per-
mutations, or all variations on all possible combinations). 
Indeed, even adults tend to believe that a coin tossed four 
times is more likely to land on heads–tails–heads–tails 
than heads–heads–heads–heads—that is, HTHT appears to 
them more representative of a two-sided coin than HHHH 
does—whereas according to mathematical theory, in fact, 
these two outcomes are precisely equiprobable. In what 
follows I refer to “H” or “T’ independent outcomes that 
compose the binomial outcome as singleton outcomes (e.g., 
HTHT is composed of four singleton outcomes).
Our design rationale began from noting that an outcome 
with 2 heads and 2 tails in any order is indeed more likely 
than an outcome with 4 heads—it is six times as likely. 
(The binomial event of 2 heads and 2 tails has six different 
favorable outcomes that are each a discernable variation on 
the 2H2T combination of four singleton outcomes, whereas 
the event of 4 heads has only one favorable outcome). As 
such, people who ignore the specific order of singleton out-
comes appear to be answering the question correctly, only 
that they are answering in accord with their subjective, 
non-normative understanding of the question (Borovcnik 
and Bentz 1991).
2.1.2  Design solution: the marbles scooper 
and combinations tower
We decided to create a binomial experiment that would 
enable students both to leverage their informal perceptual 
judgment and appreciate how mathematical formal analy-
sis elaborates on their informal judgment. We therefore 
designed a random generator that highlights the variable 
order of singleton outcomes during the experiment itself 
(see Fig. 1a), and we provided media (see Fig. 1b) for 
creating and assembling its event space (see Fig. 1c). We 
believed that making the order of singleton outcomes an 
integral structural property of the random experiment itself, 
not just a logical property of its formal analysis, would 
make the formal analysis more accessible. Presumably, by 
embedding the analytic forms into the phenomenon proper, 
we were anticipating and thus preempting challenges of 
accepting formal analysis.
2.1.3  Findings and conclusions
But we were wrong. At least, as anticipated, our partici-
pants—elementary school, middle school, undergraduate, 
or graduate students—did all offer correct informal judg-
ments of the relative likelihood of experimental outcomes, 
for example stating that a sample with two green and two 
blue marbles is more likely than a sample with four green 
marbles. Also as anticipated, they were able, at our request, 
to distinguish visually among variations in the spatial con-
figuration of green/blue marbles, and they were able to “go 
through the motions” of building the experiment’s sam-
ple space as based on these combinations and variations. 
And yet initially they did not appreciate the relevance of 
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these variations for articulating their sensation of likeli-
hood. These study participants were inclined to consider 
the formal analysis of the phenomenon only due to the mild 
pressure of the social interaction. Nevertheless, they ulti-
mately did accept the probability space (the “combinations 
tower” in Fig. 1c), because they saw that the events they 
had judged as more likely were modeled as bearing more 
variations. Elsewhere, we have characterized this cognitive 
process as abductive reasoning (Abrahamson 2012b) lead-
ing to heuristic–semiotic leaps (Abrahamson 2009). Only 
once they had appropriated these mathematical forms as 
acceptable methods of reasoning, the students retroactively 
accepted the combinatorial analysis process that had led to 
creating these products (Abrahamson 2012c).
We concluded that the property of variation (the internal 
order of singleton events within an order-less combination), 
which is critical for scientific analysis of binomial experi-
ments, is deeply at odds with a naïve view on randomness 
phenomena. This conclusion was supported by a follow-up 
controlled experiment, which demonstrated that invoking 
people’s probabilistic schemas blinds them to event varia-
tion (Mauks-Koepke et al. 2009). We thus rejected the gen-
eral Progressivist view, because we were witnessing bla-
tant and apparently incompatible discontinuity from naïve 
to scientific understanding of probability. And yet at the 
same time, all the students did ultimately accept the clas-
sicist view on the randomness experiment. What was going 
on? Did we confound our own study by using an interview 
protocol that created a learning path for our participants? 
Perhaps the protocol, ostensibly a “cold” research tool for 
eliciting and measuring knowledge, in fact instantiated an 
essential pedagogical practice. Perhaps the interviewer 
inadvertently played a critical role in enacting a produc-
tive, commendable, and culturally authentic social practice 
known as “teaching”.
If the interviewer’s dialogical participation was essential 
for the ultimate success of the learning process, this finding 
could thus be understood as vindicating the design ration-
ale. Yet for this, we reasoned, the very notion of facilitation 
would warrant fundamental rethinking. In this emerging 
understanding, the interviewer is “reappointed” from the 
outer methodological periphery of the learning event into 
the inner pedagogical circle, as an integral component of 
the activity design proper. Hence, we would not need to 
excuse ourselves for teaching the student, as though engag-
ing in dialog with a student marked a shortcoming of the 
instructional materials. Rather, we would need to interpret 
the interviewer’s function as critical in facilitating students’ 
negotiation of naïve and mathematical visualizations of the 
objects in question. That we actively led the students to 
understand the activity’s target content was cause for cel-
ebration, not shame. And yet recognizing this meant that 
something was missing in our fundamental conceptualiza-
tion of learning. Our experiments were studies not of learn-
ing per se, but of education.
2.1.4  Shifting to synthetic view
In hindsight, the transition from Progressivist to Synthetic 
views on learning was the most challenging passage in my 
recapitulation of modern educational scholarship. I faced 
the resounding failure of my prized pedagogical artifact, 
the marbles scooper, to elicit from any person an articula-
tion of their unmediated perceptual judgment in the form 
Fig. 1  Materials used in a design-based research project investigat-
ing relations between informal intuitions for likelihood and for-
mal principles of the event space: a a “marbles scooper”, a utensil 
for drawing out ordered samples from a box full of marbles of two 
colors; b a card for constructing the sample space of the marbles-
scooping experiment (a stack of such cards is provided, as well as 
a green crayon and a blue crayon, and students color in all possible 
outcomes); and c a “combinations tower”, a distributed event space 
of the marbles-scooping experiment, structured so as to render quan-
titative relations among the events conducive for heuristic perceptual 
inference
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of its mathematical counterpart. Despite having embedded 
the mathematical form as an inherent structural property of 
the interaction device, my study participants ignored this 
form—they did not differentiate objects in the shared per-
ceptual display on the basis of this property. There, right 
before our four eyes, were the variations—a set of alterna-
tive spatial layouts of a certain compound event, each creat-
ing a distinct figural pattern—and yet whereas I attended 
to this phenomenal property as bearing information that 
was critically relevant to the task at hand, my interlocutors 
disregarded this property as entirely inconsequential to the 
task.
I thus experienced a harsh breakdown in the unreflec-
tive flow of implementing my design rationale, and as a 
direct consequence of this breakdown my implicit peda-
gogical worldview “announced itself afresh” (which is 
how Heidegger describes breakdowns). I became aware of 
my implicit Progressivist belief in an individual’s would-
be capacity for unguided reinvention of culture and, then 
and there, let go of that belief. I also gave up the conveni-
ent Progressivist notions of a teacher’s essentially marginal 
role in the process of guided reinvention, as a facilitator 
who sets a course of progress but then does not intervene 
significantly along this course. I now recognized the com-
plexity of the interviewer’s multimodal discourse and came 
to think of education as a joint achievement of teacher and 
student (Cole 2009). Disillusioned with the Progressivist 
model, I scrabbled for a new one that would align with my 
cumulative empirical findings. But first I had to unravel an 
apparent dilemma.
In their informal reasoning, my study participants 
engaged not a cultural form but a primitive cognitive capac-
ity that has been documented even in neonates. On the 
one hand, the radical-constructivist view could not suffice, 
because I repeatedly observed non-continuity between this 
early capacity and the complementary analytic construction 
of the same phenomenon—students could not reinvent the 
analytic construction without heavy-handed steering (see 
also Bereiter 1985). On the other hand, neither could the 
sociocultural view suffice, because the participants had first 
to engage their unmediated perceptual skills—if they had 
not done so, then they could not know what the activity was 
about. Somewhat reluctantly, I realized that my dilemma 
could be dissolved, but at the price of my Progressivist 
identity. My educational worldview thus became Synthetic, 
a synthesis of constructivist and sociocultural views of 
learning.
Having arrived at the Synthetic view, my research 
focused on the general design problem of creating situ-
ations in which teachers can foster synthesis, that is, ena-
ble and encourage children to see a phenomenon from 
both naïve and scientific perspectives as well as to ground 
the new concepts, that is, to coordinate these alternative 
constructions via heuristic–semiotic reconciliation. This 
Synthetic view framed my design for the Kinemathics pro-
ject, as follows.
2.2  From synthetic to systemic views of learning: the 
Kinemathics project (proportion)
The Kinemathics project (Abrahamson et al. 2014b) took 
on the design problem of students’ enduring challenges 
with proportional relations (Davis 2003). The objec-
tive was to create for students’ opportunities to discover 
informal solutions to interaction problems centered on 
coordinated proportional motions in space and then syn-
thesize these solutions with a formal mathematical re-
articulation of these solutions. It was expected that the 
teacher would play an essential role in the critical phases 
of this process.
2.2.1  Design problem and rationale
When students look at 6:10 = 9:x, they are liable to make 
sense of these symbols through an “additive lens” instead 
of a “multiplicative lens”. That is, they might attend only to 
the differences among the numbers: seeing a difference of 4 
between 6 and 10 (or seeing a difference of 3 between the 
6 and 9), they infer that the other pair has the same differ-
ence, so that the unknown number is 13 (whereas it should 
be 15).
We assumed that students have little if any presymbolic 
action imagery as personal meaning for proportional equiv-
alence (Pirie and Kieren 1994; Thompson 2013). Thus, stu-
dents would need first to construct informal, presymbolic 
action imagery pertaining to proportional equivalence, and 
only then, per Synthetic rationale, they would coordinate 
additive and multiplicative views on this phenomenon. Our 
design solution was the Mathematical Imagery Trainer for 
Proportion (MIT-P).
2.2.2  Design solution: the mathematical imagery trainer 
for proportion
We seat a student at a desk in front of a large screen and ask 
the student to “make the screen green”. The MIT-P remote-
senses the heights of a user’s hands above the datum line 
(see Fig. 2a). When these heights (e.g., 2” and 4”; Fig. 2b) 
relate in accord with an unknown ratio set on the interview-
er’s console (e.g., 1:2), the screen is green. If the user then 
raises her hands in front of the display maintaining a fixed 
distance between them (e.g., keeping the 2” interval, such 
as raising both hands farther by 6” each, resulting in 8” and 
10”), the screen will turn red (Fig. 2c), because the pre-set 
ratio of 1:2 has been violated. But if she raises her hands 
appropriate distances (e.g., raising her hands farther by 3” 
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and 6”, respectively, resulting in 5” and 10”), the screen 
will remain green (Fig. 2d). Participants are tasked first 
to make the screen green and, once they have done so, to 
maintain a green screen while they move their hands. This 
new way of moving the hands is the action imagery that 
later becomes signified as proportion.
The activity advances along a sequence of stages, each 
launched by the introduction of a new display overlay (see 
Fig. 3) immediately after the student has satisfied each of 
successive protocol criteria. For example, consider a stu-
dent who is working with the cursors against a blank back-
ground (Fig. 3b). Once he articulates a strategy for mov-
ing his hands while keeping the screen green, the activity 
facilitator introduces the grid (see Fig. 3c).
The instructional intervention was initially conceptual-
ized from a Synthetic perspective. Our participants were 
first to engage in naïve exploration of the problem space 
by which they would discover a sensorimotor coordina-
tion pattern for keeping the screen green while moving the 
hands. Next, we would introduce for them the alternative 
scientific technique that utilizes the grid (for an additive 
visualization) and then also the numerals (for a multiplica-
tive visualization). These symbolic artifacts could serve as 
resources for parsing the blank space into discrete units so 
as better to control the manual actions and predict their out-
comes. That was our activity plan.
2.2.3  Findings and ontological innovation
But we were wrong. At least, as anticipated, the participants 
initially discovered how to move their hands in the “green 
zone” by gradually increasing the vertical distance between 
their hands while raising the hands. Yet once we had intro-
duced the grid onto the screen, the students did not need us 
to demonstrate, mime, or explain how to use these symbolic 
artifacts to enhance their actions—they figured out the pro-
cess on their own, without dialogic mediation, by tinkering 
with the new elements introduced into the working space. 
Instead of moving their hands continuously and simul-
taneously while adjusting their distance, the participants 
switched spontaneously to moving their hands discretely and 
sequentially, such as alternately raising the left hand 1 unit 
and the right hand 2 units, for the 1:2 setting. Later in the 
interview we helped the students reconcile the various visu-
alizations of proportional motion (Abrahamson et al. 2014b).
Thus a new sensorimotor coordination pattern, the ratio-
oriented action-based solution, emerged in the course of 
engaging the grid as a mediating auxiliary stimulus for 
accomplishing the difference-oriented solution. We named 
this phenomenon hook and shift. At first, during the hook 
stage, the problem solver detects within new features of the 
environment affordances for performing the task, where 
these affordances might be pragmatic, epistemic, or discur-
sive. Yet then, during the shift stage, in the micro-process 
of engaging and adjusting these features to serve perfor-
mance subgoals, a new action sequence emerges that is 
coupled with the environmental resources. The problem 
solver’s post facto awareness of this shift is what we typi-
cally call “learning” (Abrahamson et al. 2011). The con-
struct of hook-and-shift bears ties to the theories of dis-
tributed cognition (Martin 2009) as well as instrumental 
genesis (Vérillon and Rabardel 1995). And yet, whereas the 
learning opportunity was deliberately designed and imple-
mented, the micro-event of reinventing ratio was unguided.
We were fascinated to witness students bootstrapping 
mathematical solutions to interaction problems without direct 
dialogic intervention. At the same time, this bootstrapping 
Fig. 2  The Mathematical Imagery Trainer for Proportion (MIT-P) set 
at a 1:2 ratio, so that the target sensory event (a green background) 
occurs only when the right hand is twice as high along the monitor as 
the left hand. This figure encapsulates the study participants’ paradig-
matic interaction sequence toward discovering the proportional opera-
tory scheme: a while exploring, the student first positions the hands 
incorrectly (red feedback); b stumbles on a correct position (green); 
c raises hands maintaining a fixed interval between them (red); and d 
corrects position (green). Compare b and d to note the different verti-
cal intervals between the virtual objects
Fig. 3  MIT-P display configuration schematics, beginning with a a 
blank screen, and then featuring a set of symbolical objects incremen-
tally overlaid by the facilitator onto the display: b cursors; c a grid; 
and d numerals along the y axis of the grid. These schematics are not 
drawn to scale, and the actual device enables flexible calibrations of 
the grid, numerals, and target ratio
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occurred not in a cultural void, but in an extremely structured 
environment. Yet what exactly was the role of the researcher–
interviewer in this process? Apparently, the researcher took 
specific measures to bring the participant to the point that 
the bootstrapping could occur. And yet what were those 
measures? We re-analyzed our video data to develop a cod-
ing scheme of tutorial tactics for fostering hooks and shifts. 
Comparing this scheme to psychological (Bruner 1966) and 
cognitive-anthropology models of professional perception 
(Goodwin 1994), we concluded that theories of teaching and 
learning need to accommodate recent pedagogical, techno-
logical, and epistemological advances in the practice of math-
ematics education (Abrahamson et al. 2012), and that design-
ers and teachers should respond to students’ emerging cultural 
practices around technological devices (Negrete et al. 2013).
2.2.4  Shifting toward a systemic view
Coming into this study, we had espoused a Synthetic view 
on learning. And yet we then documented cases of senso-
rimotor exploration leading to spontaneous emergence of 
culturally appropriate operatory schemes. Our attention 
was drawn to these micro-moments of serendipity that, 
we believe, are powerful grounding experiences that could 
be fostered widely via learning activities using embodied-
interaction technology (see also Lindgren and Johnson-
Glenberg 2013). Our interest in the emergence of knowl-
edge via embodied interaction led us to dynamical-systems 
approaches to individual development (Abrahamson and 
Trninic 2015). In turn, our increasing interest in the sys-
temic co-construction of knowledge among agents operat-
ing in embodied-interaction learning spaces led us to con-
sider perspectives from Phenomenology and Enactivism on 
how people tune toward each other (Depraz et al. 2003).
The final design project case study, which I describe 
more briefly than the earlier cases, led us to perceive the 
researchers themselves as bona fide components of the 
empirical data and, as such, legitimate subjects of an 
expansive systemic investigation.
2.3  Expanding the systemic view: the Giant Steps project 
(algebra)
The Giant Steps for Algebra project (Chase and Abraham-
son 2013) addressed the pedagogical problem of introduc-
ing algebra to first-time learners. This study took place in 
parallel to Kinemathics (Sect. 2.2) and was thus conceived 
as a Synthetic project.
2.3.1  Design problem
The subject matter of algebra is challenging for many stu-
dents who struggle with the ontological nature of a variable 
quantity as well as its symbolical notation and related solu-
tion algorithms (Kieran 2007). Our Synthetic rationale was 
to create opportunities for students to reinvent normative 
scientific forms for organizing algebraic activity via ini-
tially building naïve models of situated problems and then 
reflecting on the systematicity of their models. We began 
by inquiring into common instructional methodology for 
algebra and in particular canonical situations, forms, and 
metaphors.
2.3.2  Design rationale
The logic of algebraic propositions, such as 3x + 14 = 
5x + 6, is often grounded in action schemes pertaining to 
the twin-pan balance scale (see Fig. 4a). Therein, equiva-
lence is maintained via commensurate changes to the two 
expressions on either side of the equal sign. Whereas this 
approach discloses the logic of algebraic algorithms, it is 
not presented as emerging directly from a familiar situa-
tion. Further, material masses are one step removed from 
the early developmental constructions of number as quan-
tity (de Hevia et al. 2014). Finally, the balance-scale model 
is perhaps unnecessarily complex, in that it constructs 
equivalence between measures of two different sets, the 
collective masses of two groups of objects. An alternative 
model (Dickinson and Eade 2004, see Fig. 4b) constructs 
algebraic propositions as the equivalence of two different 
expressions for the measure of one and the same object—
the length of a single line segment. The reader is invited 
to appreciate how the number-line model supports mental 
solution.
2.3.3  Design solution
In the Giant Steps for Algebra project (“GS4A”) we are 
evaluating through design experiments the following con-
jecture: Given appropriate technological mediation, stu-
dents will be able to reinvent the number-line system for 
solving situated algebra problems and then signify this 
system in symbolic notation. Working in GS4A, students 
first build a diagram in an attempt to solve a word problem. 
For example, Fig. 4b, above the line, could depict the jour-
ney of a giant who departed from the left and walked three 
Fig. 4  a Balance scale and b number-line instantiations of 
“3x + 14 = 5x + 6”
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steps followed by 14 additional meters to a destination on 
the right, where he buried treasure. Figure 4b, below the 
line, shows that this giant traveled again the following day, 
beginning from the same point of departure on the left and 
arriving at the same destination on the right, only this time 
walking five steps and an additional 6 meters, where he 
located his treasure. How large is his step?
2.3.4  Reverse scaffolding and situated intermediary 
learning objectives
In the technological incarnation of GS4A currently under 
development, the dialogic teacher is recast in software 
procedures. Students work in a computer microworld that 
includes a virtual toolbox and a modeling space. The stu-
dents read a brief story about a giant who journeys twice 
along the same path, and then they attempt to represent that 
story in a form that is similar to the image in Fig. 4b. The 
toolbox includes different settings for the giant to advance 
either in steps or meters.
The activity has students reinvent the model through a 
succession of activity levels of increasing difficulty, for 
example story items that include subtraction (walking back-
ward). At each level students struggle with what turns out 
to be a cumbersome interaction function, such as adjusting 
all the steps to be of equal length, yet once they satisfy a 
performance criterion for this level they are rewarded with 
a new function that facilitates those actions. We call this 
pedagogical design approach reverse scaffolding. Scaffold-
ing is enacting for a novice aspects of a complex practice 
they are not able to perform. Reverse scaffolding is enact-
ing for a novice aspects of a complex practice they are able 
to perform.
We are thus speaking of a type of situated pragmatic 
knowledge a child develops through tinkering with avail-
able resources in an attempt to model a hypothetical situa-
tion. An artificially intelligent pedagogical agent monitors 
and evaluates the student’s activity, and it delegates to itself 
actions and constructions that satisfy our implemented 
criteria for conceptual adequacy. We call each element of 
this emerging construction or modeling know-how situated 
intermediary learning objective (SILO). In Abrahamson 
et al. (2014a) we inquire into how our design team devel-
oped the construct of SILO. We conclude that this construct 
emerged inadvertently in our discourse as a collective prag-
matic solution to challenges of coordinating our collabora-
tive activity in a team with diverse backgrounds and com-
plementary objectives.
2.3.5  Shifting to an expanded Systemic view
By thus reflecting on and modeling our own design process, 
we are broadening the scope of what is legitimate and, we 
argue, vital for a Systemic conceptualization of mathemat-
ics education. We know that students’ learning opportunities 
and the sense teachers make of them are enabled yet con-
strained by the teachers’ content knowledge and pedagogical 
content knowledge (Sztajn et al. 2012). The same holds for 
design researchers investigating teaching and learning. And 
yet designers can play a key role in developing comprehen-
sive Systemic models of instruction, because the practice of 
creating educational artifacts sits at the nexus of teaching, 
learning, and theorizing. Our task is to conceptualize and 
build resources for fostering alignment between what we 
know and what we want our students to know. A Systemic 
approach could lend structure and process to this task.
3  Reflection
Design research can bring about transformational change 
to investigators’ conceptualization of learning, instruction, 
and design. This change comes about via the investigators’ 
attempts to solve emerging problems they encounter in the 
analysis of empirical data gathered in the implementation 
of their designs.
I began this article by summarizing Schön’s historiog-
raphy of reform-oriented educators’ views on learning 
since Rousseau. Therein, the epochs have been Romantic, 
Progressivist, and Synthetic. I then foreshadowed a fourth 
epoch, the Systemic, a dawning era that I associate with the 
cybernetic, situated, and embodiment turns in the cognitive 
sciences. Next, I surveyed my personal recapitulation of the 
phylogenetic process via a sequence of several design pro-
jects over a couple of decades of research that ultimately 
oriented me to expand the journey. Classically speaking, 
travelers on an odyssey arrive home. I did not embark from 
the Systemic perspective, but having arrived here, it does 
feel like a denizen worthy of inhabiting.
Throughout this qualitative meta-analysis, I have 
attempted to communicate coherence between emerging 
theory and emerging practice. From one project to the next, 
as my educational worldview ascended along Schön’s Gra-
dus, both my epistemological conceptualization and meth-
odological practice became more complex by expanding 
the unit of analysis. Both epistemology and methodology 
moved out of the students’ heads to embrace their embod-
ied actions and then include also the researchers’ actions, 
knowledge, and beliefs. The latter factors—determining the 
researchers’ tacit assumptions underlying design rationales 
and solutions—warranted collective dialogic investigation 
within the design-research team, and this process itself was 
analyzed. Thus, the business of design studies unfolded 
iteratively into a larger activity structure that has often 
remained undisclosed and unconsidered in the practice and 
documentation of educational research.
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In closing, I submit that two adaptations—epistemolog-
ical and methodological—are required in the practice of 
design research so as to realize its potential, and I offer that 
a Systemic view could contribute to both adaptations.
Researchers need the license of their community of 
practice to indulge and report on their ongoing introspec-
tive search for the embodied roots of meanings, which they 
conduct prior to substantiating these in the form of proto-
types (Abrahamson 2014; Schiphorst 2011; van Rompay, 
Hekkert, and Muller 2005). For this to occur, I contend, the 
community will need to engage in open discourse on how to 
align design-research methodology with phenomenological 
philosophy and embodiment theory (Depraz et al. 2003).
Systemic models would further require researchers to 
interrogate and foreground their own agendas and concep-
tual structures, which once again is challenging yet vital 
(Barwell 2009; Vagle 2010). Laboratories would need to 
cultivate an egalitarian discursive culture wherein partici-
pants reveal their own introspective reasoning processes 
as bona fide and critical objects of collaborative reflection 
promoting the collective research effort. Doing so may be 
particularly difficult to achieve in university laboratories, 
which often include undergraduate, graduate, and post-
graduate students as well as senior researchers.
Collins (1990) authored a historical technical report in 
which he laid the foundations for an educational science 
modeled after engineering practice. He ended the report 
with the following words: “There are many issues that have 
important consequences for how we should deploy the 
technologies we develop, and it is important that we start 
addressing them in a systematic way” (p. 7). I would hum-
bly add that we might address these issues in a systematic 
way by addressing them in a Systemic way.
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